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Abstract
In recent years, unconventional emergencies that have generated widespread concern in the society have frequently occurred. In
2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear crisis as a result of this disaster have gained tremendous attention
worldwide. The present paper used a system engineering approach, an extended event graph, to analyze this earthquake and its 
event evolution as well as associated contingency decisions. Some pertinent countermeasures are also presented for reference of
similar emergency event evolution in the future.
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1. Introduction 
There is a wide discussion about unconventional emergency in the academe [1–3]. In the present paper, we 
believe that an unconventional emergency is characterized by inadequate precursors, potential derivation, and 
evolutional events causing enormous destruction, resulting in the difficulty to address the situation using traditional 
emergency management methods. 
The great tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, the Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008,
and the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) in 2011 have become global concerns. These unconventional 
emergencies have caused more and more damages, including injury and death, economic loss, and adverse effects 
on the society. These emergencies have a common characteristic, that is, an initial disaster occurs and then induces 
evolutional events leading to a chain of disasters. Once the former event is dealt improperly, the latter event will 
deteriorate. A typical example is the nuclear incident that followed the GEJE. Given that China experiences frequent 
emergencies, so reflecting on the lessons of the GEJE is advantageous to refine this country’s own emergency 
management system. A clear knowledge of unconventional emergency and contingency decisions can significantly 
mitigate damages. Using the extended event graph approach [4], we analyzed the GEJE evolution and associated 
contingency decisions in the following sections. 
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2. Event Description of GEJE
The magnitude 9.0 (Mw) GEJE earthquake that occurred at 14:46 JST on 11 March 2011 was the most powerful 
known earthquake to have hit Japan. After the earthquake, approximately 4.4 million and 1.5 million households in 
northeastern Japan were left without electricity and water, respectively. 
The earthquake triggered a powerful tsunami that caused a series of nuclear crises, primarily the ongoing level 7
meltdown at three reactors in the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant complex and the associated evacuation zones, 
affecting hundreds of thousands of residents. The tsunami also created over 300,000 refugees in the Tohoku region. 
This then resulted in shortages of food, water, shelter, medicine, and fuel for the survivors. The earthquake and 
tsunami caused an extensive, as well as severe, structural damage in Japan, including heavy damage to roads and 
railways. The expressway did not reopen to the general public until 24 March 2011. Wireless and landline phone 
services suffered major disruptions in the affected area. Early estimates of insured losses from the earthquake alone 
were US $14.5 billion to $34.6 billion. Even worse, the overall cost could exceed US $300 billion, making it the 
most expensive natural disaster on record [5].
3. Extended Event Graph-Based Analysis of GEJE Emergency Evolution Chain 
After GEJE, many websites have reported on this disaster and its evolutional events. In the present paper, some 
valuable data out of 12,572 pieces of special news reports on GEJE from the Sina website were used to reveal the 
evolutional process of an earthquake disaster. 
To hold an overall review of GEJE and its evolutions, we adopted an extended event graph method [4] to 
construct associated event graphs. 
The extended event graphs are divided into two related parts, one top-level graph (Fig. 1) and six separated sub-
graphs (Figs. 2–6). The top-level graph represents the main events caused by the initial earthquake, and the sub-
graphs represent the evolution chain of each main event. Furthermore, evolution chains among different main events 
are also mutually influencing. However, given the restriction on the present paper, we chose only to analyze the 
main extended event graphs in the following. 
Tsunami
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Fig. 1. Top-level Graph of Great East Japan Earthquake
The main evolution chains of GEJE are discussed along with related news reports as follows. 
(1) The earthquake destroyed buildings that resulted in the displacement of people who had to move into 
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refugee camps. Many refugees died because of the difficult conditions in the refugee camps (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2. Event Chain C1.
The Boolean conditions of C1 include the following: j11, the buildings are not sturdy enough to resist an 
earthquake; j12, the collapsed building can no longer accommodate people; and j13, the conditions of the refugee 
camps are difficult, such that there is poor sanitation as well as a shortage of water, electricity, medicine, and 
doctors. After the GEJE, local governments offered shelters to the refugees. However, the need for basic necessities 
was not satisfied. On 17 March, 14 patients died in one refugee camp in Fukushima1. According to the surveys 
including 56 hospitals in the disaster areas involved, patients died because their illnesses deteriorated in 24 of these 
hospitals. By 12 April, a statistical figure showed that 282 people died not because of the earthquake but because of 
the poor sanitation at the refugee camps2
(2) The earthquake caused damage to communication facilities, which resulted in the delay of rescue 
operations, thereby leading to casualties (Fig. 3).
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Fig. 3. Event Chain C2.
The Boolean conditions of C2 include the following: j21, the communication facility is damaged by the 
earthquake; j22, the communication facility is not repaired in time; j23, no alternative communication method is 
taken; and j24, there are survivors to save. Communication was largely interrupted after the GEJE. 475,400 fiber-
optic services were disconnected as of 6 a.m., up 76,500 from 8 p.m., 12 March, in addition to 879,500 subscribed 
phone lines that remained out of service in areas centering on Iwate and Miyagi [6]. Rescue personnel could not 
confirm the safety of some residents in the disaster areas because of the communication interruption.
(3) The earthquake caused damage to transportation facilities, which resulted in the delay of rescue operations, 
thereby leading to casualties (Fig. 4).
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Fig. 4. Event Chain C3.
The Boolean conditions of C3 include the following: j31, the transportation facility is damaged by the earthquake; 
j32, the transportation facility is not repaired in time; j33, no alternative transport method is taken; and j34, there are 
survivors to save. The transport network in Japan suffered severe disruptions because of the earthquake. On 13 
March, thousands of passengers were trapped inside the Sendai terminal. The terminal was surrounded with 3-meter 
high water and garbage piles, which blocked the rescue path [7]. There were also not enough helicopters to rescue so 
many people. Several people died because of the delay in rescue.
(4) The earthquake caused damage to electric facility, which resulted in power failure. The electricity failure 
paralyzed the transport, thereby leading to casualties (Fig. 5).
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Fig. 5. Event Chain C4.
                                                          
1 http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2011-03-17/033922128946.shtml
2 http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2011-04-12/092722277283.shtml
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The Boolean conditions of C4 include the following: j41, the electric facility is damaged by the earthquake; j42, 
the electric facility is not repaired in time; j43, the transportation is supported by electrical power; j44, no alternative 
transport method is taken; and j45, there are survivors to save. After the GEJE, the power failure caused the 
Shinkansen to halt. Due to power shortages caused by the GEJE, rolling blackouts in the capital circle began on 14 
March, which intended to fill power gaps, not only caused traffic paralysis but also caused the shortage of food, 
drinks, gasoline, and other supplies to disaster areas [8].
(5) The earthquake caused the failure of external electrical power. Meanwhile, the tsunami triggered by the 
earthquake disrupted the backup cooling system. The two events, together, enhanced the temperature of the nuclear 
reactors, thus leading to explosions and damage to the reactor vessel. Either the explosions or the damage of the 
reactor vessels resulted in radioactive leakage, leading to casualties. Moreover, the improper disposal of cooling 
wastewater generated nuclear pollution (Fig. 6).
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Fig. 6. Event Chain C5.
The Boolean conditions of C5 include the following: for j41 and j42, similar to the former event chain, C4; j51, 
the earthquake triggers a tsunami; j52, the emergency generators are damaged by the tsunami; j53, the emergency 
generators are not repaired in time; j54, no effective cooling method is taken to remove the heat promptly; j55, no 
effective method is taken to prevent explosions; j55ƍ QR HIIHFWLYHPHWKRG LV WDNHQ WR SUHYHQW WKH GDPDJH RI WKH
reactor vessels; j55”, water is poured into the reactors for cooling; j56, the cooling wastewater is not disposed 
properly; j57, true without any preconditions; and j58, no effective evacuation is executed promptly. 
After the GEJE and the tsunami, at least three nuclear reactors suffered explosions because of the hydrogen gas 
that built up within the outer containment buildings after the cooling system failure. Reports suggest that radioactive 
iodine was detected in the tap water in Fukushima, Tochigi, Gunma, Tokyo, Chiba, Saitama, and Niigata. 
Radioactive cesium was detected in the tap water in Fukushima, Tochigi, and Gunma. Radioactive cesium, iodine, 
and strontium were also detected in the soil in some places in Fukushima. Food products were also contaminated by 
radioactive matter in several places in Japan [5]. On 31 March, radioactive matter from the Fukushima I nuclear 
power plant was detected in many countries, such as Russia, South Korea, and France.
4. Contingency Decision Analysis Based on Extended Event Graph
By analyzing the associated contingency decisions of these evolution chains and by shortening these chains, the 
damage arising from a disaster can be significantly mitigated, especially the casualties. In this manner, we might 
lead the evolution to the most beneficial direction. Therefore, based on the event chain constructed, we can make 
contingency decisions to reduce possibilities of targeted events, especially, to avoid mitigation to a specified event.
4.1. General Decision Analysis Model
      First, we can calculate the probability of one event evoluted from the event source based on the extended event 
graph, e.g., the earthquake in GEJE. 
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      For the simple causality BA Jo , e.g., event chain C1, the probability of event B is 
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     A contingency decision can be described as a set D=(di, Ri, i=1,2,...,m), where di is the decision scheme,  e.g., 
proving water and food, repairing transport port, building temporary residence, etc. Ri is a matrix of resources 
needed in  decision di and di is a function of Ri. Based on the extended event graph, we hope to prevent the onset of 
a disaster or reduce the impacts should one occur. Suppose a decision  D is adopted to prevent the onset of event B, 
after an event chain {Ci, i=1,2,...,m} evolution with the beginning of event A, then based on eq.(1)-(3), we can 
calculate the probability of event B with appropriate decision set D=(di, Ri, i=1,2,...,m), di is adopted to event Ci. Then a 
general model for the contingency decision is as follows:
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4.2. Contingency Decisions of the GEJE
      Based on the general decision analysis model, we can analyze the contingency decisions of the GEJE. For reason 
of space, the detailed discussions are omitted and only the results are proposed as follows. 
(1) For C1, the number of casualties can be reduced by improving the environment of refugee camps, storing 
enough water and food in refugee camps, repairing transport ports promptly, and building temporary residences as 
soon as possible. All of the ports of Japan were briefly closed after the earthquake, although those in Tokyo and 
southward soon reopened. Fifteen ports were located in the disaster zone. All 15 ports reopened to limited ship 
traffic by 29 March 2011 [5]. In this manner, the need of basic necessities can be satisfied. 
(2) For C2, the casualties can be reduced by repairing communication facilities promptly, using an alternative 
communication method, and so on. After the GEJE, many online social networking sites, such as Twitter and 
Facebook, played important roles to help in the rescue operations. Even the Japanese government used these 
websites to broadcast notices [9]. From these data, the use of stable communication facilities in case of such disaster 
has been emphasized. Once a disaster breaks out, at least one mode of communication should work. 
(3) For C3, prompt restoration of transportation facilities and considering alternative transportation to reduce 
casualties are important. After the GEJE, all of fifteen Japan’s ports in the disaster zone were closed. By 29 March, 
all of them reopened to limited ship traffic, and the first ship that carried 2 million liters of petrol arrived at the port 
of Fukushima, which intended to fill the gaps in the lack of fuel. However, the shortage in basic necessities in the 
disaster areas reflects the block of supply channels [10].
(4) For C4, the crucial contingency decision is to repair electric facilities. The failure of electrical power 
affected many areas, such as railway, residential use, commercial use, public use, and so on.
(5) For C5, there are many measures to solve the nuclear crisis, such as pouring water to cool the reactors, 
releasing vapors out of the vessels to release stress, injecting nitrogen gas to prevent the reaction between hydrogen 
and oxygen gases, and offering electricity to the plants. After a radioactive leakage, evacuation of residents is 
needed.
The nuclear crisis became worse mainly because Japan made improper contingency decisions during the process. 
Japan did not have a long-term vision in solving the crisis. In the first stage of the nuclear crisis, Japan was busy 
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pouring water into the plants, which led to the accumulation of 110,000 tons of highly radioactive wastewater. At 
first, the procedure seemed promising. However, in the following stage of the nuclear crisis, the wastewater
remained in the basements of the plant, in turn, blocked the passage, which was crucial for the workers to construct 
electric cables [11]. On 24 March, three workers were exposed to high levels of radiation which caused two of them 
to require hospital treatment after radioactive water seeped through their protective clothes while working in unit 3 
[12]. Therefore, the injection of cooling water delayed the overall plan to solve the nuclear crisis. Moreover, Japan 
initially refused international help to solve the Fukushima I nuclear power plant crisis. Until 31 March, Japan finally 
decided to accept technical aids from the USA and France. This phenomenon showed the necessity of having 
enough backup emergency generators at the plants. Moreover, prompt restoration of electric power is the 
fundamental solution to prevent the nuclear crisis from deteriorating, once external power fails after backup 
generators become damaged. 
Hence, two crucial reflections may be derived from the analysis of the GEJE. First, the electric facilities should 
be repaired as soon as possible after a disaster breaks out. Second, enough supply of basic necessities for the 
survivors should be maintained while dealing with other crises. 
5. Conclusion 
Unconventional emergencies have become an important problem for academic and practical purposes. Through 
constructing extended event graphs of unconventional emergency evolution and analyzing associated contingency 
decisions based on the system engineering analysis approach, the present paper finally reveals several lessons on 
formulating contingency decisions based on the case of the GEJE. We consider these lessons to be valuable for 
researchers. However, the unconventional emergency management is a fresh field and its associated problems still 
remain to be solved, especially on how to realize the unconventional emergency theory into practical use. There is 
much room for improvement on how to combine the existing qualitative analysis with a more quantitative analysis 
of unconventional emergency.
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